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BOOK REVIEW
THINKING ABOUT PRESIDENTS
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: RATING THE BEST AND THE WORST IN THE
WHITE HOUSE. Edited by James Taranto & Leonard Leo. Free Press:
Wall Street Journal Books. 2004. Pp. 291. $26.00.
RobertJ. Delahuntyt &John C. Yoott
Presidents get short shrift in most constitutional law courses.
Take some of the leading casebooks. In the most recent edition of
Constitutional Law,' by Jesse Choper et al., the discussion of the Presi-
dent's powers vis-A-vis Congress runs about 60 pages out of 1542.2 In
Gerald Gunther and Kathleen Sullivan's Constitutional Law,3 presiden-
tial powers also appears in roughly 60 pages of a 1600-page casebook.
4
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking,5 by Paul Brest et al., devotes
roughly 110 pages out of 1600 pages to presidential power issues, 6 and
Constitutional Law,7 by Geoffrey Stone et al., spends about 100 pages
out of 1560 on the topic.8 William Eskridge, Daniel Farber, and Philip
Frickey's Constitutional LawP has a slightly larger percentage: 110 pages
out of 1080 pages.10 All casebook editors must make choices, of
course, and no doubt they would add more pages on every subject if
only book publishers would let them. Nonetheless, the relative space
devoted to presidential power in these books suggests the amount of
time many, if not most, teachers of constitutional law can spend on
the Presidency in an introductory course.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
tt Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall);
Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. We thank Will Trachman for excellent
research assistance.
1 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (9th
ed. 2001).
2 Id. at 146-205.
3 GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (15th ed. 2004).
4 Id. at 355-414.
5 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEcISIONMAING: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000).
6 Id. at 621-728.
7 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSIITUTIONAL LAw (3d ed. 1996).
8 Id. at 385-492.
9 WILLIAM ESKRIDGE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S
THIRD CENTURY (3d ed. 2003).
10 Id. at 1064-75.
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Notwithstanding the Rehnquist Court's efforts to reinvigorate federal-
ism, research on constitutional law mirrors its teaching by concentrat-
ing on judicial review and individual rights. That focus would
probably strike many others outside the field of constitutional law as
odd. We all tend to mark political time by presidential administra-
tion, and we certainly attribute great importance to the decisions Pres-
idents make. Presidents head their political parties, they manage the
bureaucracy, and they play a significant role in the legislative process.
Most of all, they exercise a host of constitutional authorities, ranging
from the power to nominate officials, to execute the laws, to veto legis-
lation, and to command the armed forces of the United States. These
powers have become salient in the American response to the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attack, which has included invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq, a worldwide campaign to capture or kill leaders of the al Qaeda
terrorist network, the detention of both aliens and citizens as enemy
combatants without criminal trial, the creation of special military com-
missions to try terrorists, and expanded efforts to ensure homeland
security. While Congress has assented to some of these measures,
President Bush has invoked his plenary powers as Commander in
Chief to institute others.
An engaging new book, Presidential Leadership: Rating the Best and
the Worst in the White House," sharpens this contrast between the pub-
lic's fascination with Presidents and the legal academy's relative lack
of interest in the subject. The editors are representatives of two insti-
tutions that probably would not win a popularity contest among law
professors: James Taranto is an editor of the Wall Street Journal edito-
rial page and online version, OpinionJournal;12 Leonard Leo is the ex-
ecutive vice president of the Federalist Society, which has served as a
haven for conservative lawyers, students, and professors by establish-
ing a balanced speakers series in law schools and cities throughout the
country. 13 Presidential Leadership presents a survey of professors of law,
political science, and history who were all asked to rank the most suc-
cessful Presidents. The book then illustrates the results with a short
essay on each President in chronological order. These profiles are a
gem, as they bring together observations from an eclectic group of
writers and thinkers about American Presidents, from the greatest
(George Washington) to the worst (James Buchanan).
11 PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: RATING THE BEST AND THE WORST IN THE WHITE HOUSE
(James Taranto & Leonard Leo eds., 2004).
12 Taranto is also the author of the "Best of the Web Today" column, one of the
funniest political offerings on the internet.
13 In the interest of full disclosure, one of us has contributed to the Wall StreetJour-
nal's opinion pages and spoken at Federalist Society events. See, e.g.,John Yoo, The Supreme
Court Goes to War, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2004, at A8; John Yoo, Terrorists Have No Geneva
Rights, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004, at A16.
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In this review, we discuss the results of the survey and some of the
stories about the Presidents. We then ask why a gap exists between
popular fascination with the Presidency and its academic study, at
least in law schools. We conclude with some thoughts about the rela-
tionship between presidential success and constitutional law. Part I
discusses the book's statistical findings about popularity and the Presi-
dents and the accompanying essays. Part II asks why law professors
and political scientists seem to be speaking past each other in the field
of presidential studies. Part III suggests some ways in which insights
from constitutional law and political scientists could join to provide
interesting perspectives on the Presidency. We conclude with some
thoughts about Presidents in wartime.
I
Presidential Leadership presents the results of a survey of academic
opinions about Presidents. Some of these results are rather conven-
tional, but some are a surprise. What is truly fascinating about the
book, however, are the short essays on each President written by dif-
ferent authors. They bring together an amazing array of writers and
thinkers. They include political scientists, such as Jeremy Rabkin and
Jeffrey Tulis; political philosophers, such as Robert George and Har-
vey Mansfield; historians such as Robert Dallek and Forrest McDon-
ald; and law professors such as Steven Calabresi, James Lindgren, and
John McGinnis. Presidential Leadership also includes members of the
"commentariat," as one of the editors recently dubbed them:14 those
who write opinion pieces for newspapers and the internet and increas-
ingly appear on the proliferation of political talk shows on network,
public, and cable television. These include several editors of the Wall
Street Journal, including its former and current chiefs, Robert Bartley
and Paul Gigot; former speechwriters like Peggy Noonan; and shapers
of public opinion like Judge Robert Bork and second lady Lynne Che-
ney. There is also a sprinkling of current and former government offi-
cials, such as Senator John McCain, former Attorney General Edwin
Meese III, and former Solicitor General Theodore Olson. While most
of these writers are instantly recognizable as conservatives or Republi-
cans, not all of them are-historians H.W. Brands and Douglas Brink-
ley, for example.
Ranking Presidents may be a peculiarly American enterprise.
15
One has difficulty imagining the French rating the best monarchs and
prime ministers, or the Chinese scoring the best emperors. It may
14 See, e.g., James Taranto, How to Misread a Poll, OPINIONJOURNAL, Oct. 25, 2002, at
http://www.opinionjoumal.com/best/?id-l 10002528.
15 See Rtc -siu E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 1
(1960) ("In the United States, we like to 'rate' a President. We measure him as 'weak' or
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have to do with some deep American need to create lists, such as the
ten best ways to improve one's looks or the ten best cars in America.
We have been rating Presidents since at least 1948, when historian
Arthur Schlesinger Sr. first polled historians for Life magazine and
then duplicated the effort in 1962 for the New York Times Magazine.16
Schlesinger's son, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., conducted the best-known
survey for the New York Times in 1996.17 Presidential Leadership contains
several significant improvements over these earlier studies. First,
Schlesinger polled only thirty-two historians and other experts,18 while
Taranto and Leo sent their survey to 132 professors of history, law,
and political science, asking them to rate all the Presidents on a five-
point scale. 19 Seventy-eight of them responded.20 Second, the Schles-
inger study faced criticism for relying too heavily on liberal professors;
other studies allegedly were too conservative.2 1 Taranto and Leo
sought to control for political orientation by asking a panel of six ex-
perts from different fields and political orientations to suggest lists of
survey participants. 2 2 Third, while the Schlesinger study included ap-
proximately only one woman and no minorities; the Taranto and Leo
study included about fifteen percent women and minority
respondents. 23
After receiving the results, the editors organized the Presidents
into five groups: great, near great, average, below average, and fail-
ure.24 Only three Presidents made "great": Washington, Lincoln, and
Franklin Roosevelt.2 5 The top eleven Presidents in the survey are the
following:26
'strong' and call what we are measuring his 'leadership.' We do not wait until a man is
dead; we rate him from the moment he takes office.").
16 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton, 112 Poi- Sci.
Q. 179, 179 (1997) (describing the two studies that his father conducted).
17 Id. (describing the author's own recent study).
18 Id. at 190 (listing participants); Alvin S. Felzenberg, "There You Go Again": Liberal
Historians and The New York Times Deny Ronald Reagan His Due, POL'y REv., Mar./Apr.
1997, at 51, 51.
19 PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 11, at 11.
20 Id. In the interests of full disclosure, one of the authors of this review participated
in the survey.
21 See, e.g., id. at 250 n.1; Felzenberg, supra note 18, at 51 (criticizing Schlesinger's
study as too liberal).
22 The six experts were Akhil Reed Amar, Alan Brinkley, Steven G. Calabresi, James
Caesar, Forrest McDonald, and Stephen Skowronek. PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, supra note
11, at 249. Most scholars interested in the Presidency would not dispute the choice of
these six.
23 Id. at 251.
24 Id. at 254-57. These are the same categories used in previous surveys. See id at
254.
25 Id. at 255.
26 Id. at 253.
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1. George Washington 4.92
2. Abraham Lincoln 4.87
3. Franklin Roosevelt 4.67
4. Thomas Jefferson 4.25
5. Theodore Roosevelt 4.22
6. Andrew Jackson 3.99
7. Harry Truman 3.95
8. Ronald Reagan 3.81
9. Dwight Eisenhower 3.71
10. James Polk 3.70
11. Woodrow Wilson 3.68
The above Presidents from Jefferson through Wilson ranked as "near
great."27
Most Presidents rated as above average, average, or below aver-
age. Only four Presidents were ranked as failures: Andrew Johnson,
Franklin Pierce, Warren Harding, and James Buchanan. 28 The ten
worst Presidents in the survey are as follows: 29
30. Jimmy Carter 2.47
31. Zachary Taylor 2.40
32. Ulysses Grant 2.28
33. Richard Nixon 2.22
34. John Tyler 2.03
35. Millard Fillmore 1.91
36. Andrew Johnson 1.65
37. Franklin Pierce 1.58
38. Warren Harding 1.58
39. James Buchanan 1.33
Even with the more rigorous methodological measures, the 2000 Ta-
ranto/Leo study correlates with the 1996 Schlesinger study at an
amazing 0.94.30 Apparently, political scientists and law professors
shared historians' basic view of Presidents.
Some interesting observations about the results of the survey are
worth making. First, the only real difference between the results of
the Taranto/Leo study and the Schlesinger study occurred over the
place of Ronald Reagan. 3 1 In 1996, historians rated Reagan at twenty-
fifth, 32 which would have tied him with Chester Arthur and Calvin
Coolidge and put him behind Clinton. In the Taranto/Leo study,
27 Id. at 255.
28 Thesurvey did not include George W. Bush because Bush was not yet President at
the time the authors conducted the survey. Id. at 12. William Henry Harrison and James
Garfield both served too short a time to make the survey. Id.
29 Id. at 254.
30 Id. at 251 & n.7.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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Reagan rose to eighth, even before his death and funeral last year.3 -
Much of that change is likely due to the passage of time, which has
reduced the bias against Reagan by many liberals in the academy and
has increased appreciation for his role in ending the Cold War. Eisen-
hower experienced a similar rise between the 1962 and 1996 surveys. 3 4
Intellectuals belittled Eisenhower during and shortly after his adminis-
tration, but with the passage of time, the revelation of new historical
materials, and revisionist historical analyses (particularly Fred Green-
stein's The Hidden-Hand Presidency3 5 ), his reputation has risen from just
above Andrew Johnson in 1962 to ninth today.3 6
Second, and related to the first point, is the performance of mod-
ern Presidents. The ten most recent Presidents ranked in the follow-
ing way (listed in chronological order):3 7
7. Harry Truman 3.95
9. Dwight Eisenhower 3.71
18. John Kennedy 3.17
17. Lyndon Johnson 3.21
33. Richard Nixon 2.22
28. Gerald Ford 2.59
30. Jimmy Carter 2.47
8. Ronald Reagan 3.81
21. George H. W. Bush 2.92
24. Bill Clinton 2.77
Since 1960, only Reagan has made the great or near-great category.
One explanation may be that it is difficult to judge recent Presidents,
but it also may be that the United States has suffered a run of medio-
cre leadership since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman,
and Dwight Eisenhower. Recent Presidents do appear to be the most
controversial, in terms of standard deviations. The most controversial
President was Bill Clinton, and, although the second most controver-
sial was Woodrow Wilson, the next three were Ronald Reagan, Rich-
ard Nixon, and Lyndon Johnson. 38 More than half of all respondents
also listed John Kennedy as the most overrated President-a "shock-
ing consensus," in the words of Professor James Lindgren, who han-
dled the statistical analysis for the Taranto/Leo study.3 9 In a
demonstration of the difficulty in judging recent Presidents, however,
-.- Id. at 251, 253.
34 Compare Schlesinger, supra note 16, at 182, with PRESIENTmL LEADERSHIP, supra
note 11, at 253.
-Vi FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN-HAND PRESIDENCY. EISENHOWER AS LEADER (1982).
36 PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 11, at 253.
37 Id. at 255-57 (listing the ranking of all Presidents).
318 Id. at 258.
39 Id. at 259.
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respondents simultaneously ranked Reagan as both the second most
overrated President and the first most underrated President.
40
Third, it is interesting to guess at the predictors of presidential
success. Partisan affiliation seems to have little to do with it.4 1 Simi-
larly, age at time of inauguration seems to have no effect.42 Selection
before the period of nomination by national political conventions has
a significant effect, but the most direct impact appears to be whether
someone serves more than one term.43 James Polk is the only one-
term President to make the great or near-great category.44 Of course,
this raises a chicken/egg problem: Do Presidents win two terms be-
cause of their greatness, or does their greatness only emerge because
they have eight years to control the office?
Of course, it may also be that mere historical circumstances have
brought out the greatness of some of our Presidents. Placing in the
great and near-great categories does seem to correlate with moments
when the nation is at war. Washington (as a general), Lincoln, and
Franklin Roosevelt brought the nation through its three most funda-
mental conflicts-the Revolutionary and Civil Wars and World War II.
Polk's Mexican-American War made the United States a continent-
wide power, and Wilson brought the nation into World War I. If one
treats the long struggle with the Soviet Union as a single war, in which
the United States was often engaged in conflict, maintained its first
large standing military in peacetime, and was under constant threat of
attack, then Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan would also qualify as
wartime Presidents. Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Jackson
would be the only great or near-great Presidents left. Although none
of these was a war-time President, each of them made a national repu-
tation during war (Jefferson in the Revolution; Jackson in the War of
1812; Roosevelt in the Spanish-American War).
Presidential Leadership is not just a book of numbers. It attempts to
bring each President to life with a short essay on each Chief Executive.
There is some excellent academic commentary, particularly by histori-
ans: Forrest McDonald on Jefferson, 4 5 H. W. Brands on Jackson,46
Douglas Brinkley on Polk,47 and Robert Dallek on Lyndon Johnson.
48
Perhaps the most fascinating essays, however, are the work of nonhis-
torians, in part because they say much about the authors. For exam-
40 Id.
41 See id. at 261-62.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 253.
45 Id. at 25-29.
46 Id. at 44-47.
47 Id. at 60-63.
48 Id. at 173--77.
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pie, John McCain writes about Theodore Roosevelt's devotion to the
ideal of American greatness:
He understood the central fact of American history: that we are not
just an association of disparate interests forced by law and custom to
tolerate one another, but a kinship of ideals, worth living and dying
for, and that we deserve to have our ideals vigorously represented at
home and abroad by our national government.4 9
One can imagine that McCain hopes that someday biographers will
reach the same judgment about him, and in that he likely will not be
disappointed. Former Solicitor General Theodore Olson writes that
William Howard Taft was a man of judicious temperament and effi-
cient administration as President and Chief Justice. 50 Olson ulti-
mately defended Taft's theory of the unitary executive pro se in
Morrison v. Olson.5 1 Judge Robert Bork criticizes Franklin D.
Roosevelt's expansion of the federal bureaucracy and failure to cure
the Depression, but praises his "unwavering optimism" and perform-
ance as Commander in Chief during World War II-this from a man
who would not be faulted if he were to have lost his own optimism
after his nasty confirmation hearings.52
Commentary on recent Presidents contains some interesting ob-
servations. Peggy Noonan, who once wrote about her admiration for
Kennedy, 53 strikingly observes that Kennedy did not seem to believe in
anything, but feared everything, and marked the beginning of the
modern political Presidency, which focuses on image and glamour
over substance-a trend one might argue she accelerated through her
deft speechwriting for President Reagan. 54 Perhaps not surprisingly,
once independent counsel and now dean Kenneth Starr devotes his
essay on Richard Nixon almost wholly to Watergate. 55 Unexpectedly,
Starr praises Nixon's fight for executive privilege as "an act of leader-
ship, for it sought to preserve the power of the office for future Presi-
dents," and asks whether his decision to comply with the Supreme
Court's order to produce the tapes was not ultimately a similar act of
49 Id. at 129.
50 See id. at 130-34.
51 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
52 PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 11, at 156-58.
53 See, e.g., Peggy Noonan, JFK Disease: It's More than "Hoffr Wacky, OPINIONJOURNAL,
Mar. 4, 2004 (comparing recent attempts, many unavailing, by Democrats to link them-
selves with the imagination and leadership qualities ofJFK), at http://www.opinionjoumal.
com/columnists/pnoonan/?id= 110004768; Peggy Noonan, Will the Real John Keny Please
Stand Up , OPINIONJOURNAL, July 22, 2004 (admiringJFK for not attempting to model him-
self in FDR's image, and chidingJohn Kerry for excessively "make believ[ing]" he isJFK),
at http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110005383.
54 PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 11, at 168-72.
55 Id. at 178-82.
1160 [Vol. 90:1153
THINKING ABOUT PRESIDENTS
leadership.56 Professor Harvey Mansfield argues that Reagan did not
have a coherent intellectual doctrine, but kept to simple core be-
liefs-particularly that the Soviet Union was indeed evil and could be
defeated by the superior economy and values of the West-that suc-
ceeded in winning the Cold War. 57 Historian Paul Johnson extols
Clinton's campaigning skills, but conveys a sense of the emptiness be-
hind them with a story: Clinton once came to Johnson's neighbor-
hood of Notting Hill in London, where an excited and delighted
crowd greeted him. Clinton led them to a pub where he ordered a
round of drinks for all, to much cheering, and left them all happy and
impressed, except for the bartender whom he never paid for the
round.58
Presidential Leadership contains numerous stories and insights like
these, and it would be unfair to the authors of the book to repeat
them all. It is far better to buy the book, as anyone interested in the
Presidency should.
II
Why do law professors not write such interesting books? Or, to
ask perhaps the antecedent question, why do law professors not find
the presidency interesting enough to inspire sustained, book-length
works? This Part suggests that law professors have reached a formalist
stalemate over the powers of the Presidency and that this stalemate
has diverted attention away from interesting avenues of scholarly re-
search. Prevailing methods for analyzing Presidents in political sci-
ence, which focuses on the individual characteristics of the Chief
Executive as a political leader, only compounds this problem. In a
sense, the two disciplines have been talking past each other-law ex-
amines the formal constitutional powers, while political scientists have
focused on the unique political character of individual Presidents. We
think, however, that recent work in law and political science points to
new directions that could escape the current stalemate.
Current legal scholarship on the Presidency has focused almost
exclusively on the meaning of Article II's vesting of the "executive
[p]ower" in a single President. 59 Some scholars, most notably Profes-
sors Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, argue that Article II's
Vesting Clause grants the President an inherent executive authority of
56 Id. at 181-82.
57 Id. at 193-97.
58 Id. at 202-07.
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.").
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sweeping range.6 ° Others, such as Professor Akhil Amar on executive
privilege,6 1 Professor Michael Paulsen on judicial review, 62 and the
two of us on foreign affairs, 63 have subscribed to certain elements of
this approach in writing on more discrete subjects. All of these schol-
ars can trace their basic insight back to Alexander Hamilton's argu-
ments as Pacificus. In 1793, President Washington interpreted the
1778 Franco-American Treaty of Alliance as not requiring entry into
the European wars on the side of France. 64 Defending Washington's
authority to interpret the treaty and declare American neutrality,
Hamilton argued that Article II's Vesting Clause provided the Presi-
dent with inherent executive authorities that the Constitution had not
specifically transferred to Congress or shared between the President
and Senate.
65
Critics of this theory argue that the Vesting Clause is essentially
empty and that the Constitution limits the powers of the President to
those enumerated in Article II, Section 2. Scholars such as Lawrence
Lessig and Cass Sunstein argue that, while the Vesting Clause may es-
tablish a single President, it does not grant any substantive powers. 66
Rather, Congress may structure the executive branch within fairly
broad boundaries and direct which officials will execute statutory
mandates. 67 They counter Hamilton's textual thesis with the argu-
ment that, if the Vesting Clause had the reach he attributes to it, the
enumeration of powers in Article II, Section 2, would have been su-
perfluous. 68 They also draw upon the Necessary and Proper Clause to
support the claim that Congress can "determine the means for specify-
ing how powers-and again, all powers-in the federal government
are to be exercised." 69
60 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541 (1994).
61 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REv. 647
(1996); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARv. L. Rv. 701 (1995).
62 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 217 (1994).
631 See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The Army, Navy and
Militia Clauses, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021 (2003); RobertJ. Delahunty &John C. Yoo, The
President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations
and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'v 487 (2002); John C.
Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639 (2002).
64 These events are described in John Yoo, Review Essay, Politics as Law?: The Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REv. 851,
896-99 (2001).
65 See id. at 896-99.
66 See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 47-48 (1994).
67 See id. at 118.
68 Id. at 48.
69 Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted).
1162 [Vol. 90:1153
THINKING ABOUT PRESIDENTS
These debates have not resolved themselves. Indeed, they have
persisted unabated since the days of the Helvidius-Pacificus debates. 70
Such issues were raised during the creation of the first independent
commissions during the New Deal, but the Court overruled them.71
They made a brief appearance in the academic literature when Presi-
dent Reagan sought to impose cost-benefit analysis on regulatory deci-
sionmaking without any specific congressional authorization. 7 2
During the 1990s, they reappeared in the controversies over President
Clinton's invocation of executive privilege 73 and his impeachment. 74
Nonetheless, constitutional law arguments have not moved signifi-
cantly since the publication of the debates between Lessig/Sunstein
and Calabresi/Prakash. 75 Rather, both sides have added to their his-
torical evidence and their textual and structural arguments without
really convincing each other to adjust their positions. The debate
often occurs at the fairly abstract level of whether the President has
the authority to command subordinate executive branch officials, or
whether Congress can shape the administrative agencies as it chooses.
These are not the questions, however, that have often appeared in the
courts.
Meanwhile, legal scholarship has failed to engage the major
themes in the analysis of the Presidency in political science. There
has always been a significant tradition in political science that has
looked to the American Presidency to explore themes in American
political thought. Such approaches stress the creation of the Presi-
dency within the context of the Framing and the larger question of
the meaning of executive power within a republican form of govern-
70 See Yoo, supra note 64, at 899-901 (discussing the Helvidius-Pacificus debates).
71 See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
72 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Christopher C.
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1075 (1986) (discussing the role of presidential supervision in the regulatory process in
light of President Reagan's executive orders); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role
of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 181 (1986) (same); cf
Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REv.
491 (1987) (analyzing the administrative state in light of the Supreme Court's separation
of powers jurisprudence and arguing that independent agencies should not be constitu-
tionally insulated from presidential supervision) ; Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and
Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEo. L.J. 671 (1992)
(discussing the constitutionality of the modem administrative state from the perspective of
positive political theory).
73 See, e.g., Amar & Katyal, supra note 61.
74 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the Im-
peachment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 349 (1999); cf. Jonathan Turley,
Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 Duke L.J. 1 (1999)
(addressing impeachment as a method of resolving factional disputes about an official's
legitimacy to remain in office).
75 See supra notes 60, 66-69 and accompanying text.
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ment.76 This work has obvious synergies with the formalist approach
to the study of the Presidency among constitutional lawyers.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that political science has moved in a
different direction in the last forty-five years since the 1960 publica-
tion of Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents.
77
Neustadt argued that the Presidency was a fundamentally weak office
beset by foreign and domestic events and the demands of domestic
interest groups, party members, and other institutions. 78 At the same
time, the public has expected Presidents to guarantee national secur-
ity and economic growth, and to represent national values. 79 This
combination of institutional weakness and popular expectations re-
quires Presidents to seek the cooperation of the other actors in the
political system. 80 In order to achieve success, the President must bar-
gain and deal with the members of Congress who write the laws and
the bureaucrats who issue the regulations. 81  For Neustadt,
" [p] residential power is the power to persuade," not the power to
command.8 2 Scholars who have followed Neustadt-most recently
Fred Greenstein in The Presidential Difference 3-have sought to root
the President's power in characteristics such as communicative and
political skills, organizational ability, vision, cognitive style, and emo-
tional intelligence. 84
It is important to realize what this theory means for the formal
constitutional powers that are at the heart of the law professors' analy-
sis. According to the approach of political scientists, a President's reli-
ance upon unilateral constitutional powers means that he cannot
76 See, e.g., HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: TIlE AMBIVALENCE OF MOD-
ERN EXFCIITIVE POWER (1989); FORREST McDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN IN-rEL,
I.ECrrUAL HISTORY (1994); THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (Joseph M.
Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981).
77 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL PowER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960).
78 Id. at 36-37 ("[Olutcomes are not guaranteed by (the President's] advantages.
There remain the counter pressures those whom he would influence can bring to bear on
him from vantage points at their disposal. Command has limited utility; persuasion be-
comes give-and-take.").
79 Id. at 10 (describing instances where presidential command is effective, necessary,
and yet costly-Truman's recall of General Douglas MacArthur, Truman's seizure of the
steel mills, and Eisenhower's deployment of federal troops to Little Rock to enforce deseg-
regation orders).
80 Id. at 35 ("The President's advantages are checked by the advantages of others.
Continuing relationships will pull in both directions. These are relationships of mutual
dependence. A President depends upon the men he would persuade; he has to reckon
with his need or fear of them.").
81 Id. at 46 ("The essence of a President's persuasive task with congressmen and every-
body else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of therm is what their own appraisal of their
own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his.").
82 Id. at 10, 35-46.
88 FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE PRESIDENTIAL DIFFERENCE: LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM FDR TO
CLINTON (2000).
84 Id. at 5-6.
1164 [Vol. 90: 1153
THINKING ABOUT PRES[DENTS
persuade, and hence, that he has failed. Presidents who rely on the
veto or appointment powers, Neustadt argues, have reached "a painful
last resort, a forced response to the exhaustion of all other remedies,
suggestive less of mastery than failure-the failure of attempts to gain
an end by softer means. '8 5 Ironically, law professors consider impor-
tant exactly those actions that political scientists believe signal failure.
Likewise, the issues that political scientists think determine presiden-
tial success are exactly those factors that will remain immune to for-
mal legal analysis-personality, charisma, and political skills.
Political scientists seem to define presidential success by their
ability to push their agenda through Congress or the courts. This
does not measure well on the scale of greatness in the Taranto/Leo
study. Washington, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt did not achieve
greatness solely by convincing Congress to enact their legislative
plans; otherwise, Lyndon Johnson would be considered the greatest
President in history. Rather, they achieved success by exercising na-
tional leadership through their constitutional and political powers,
with legislative cooperation coming sometimes as a fait accompli.
Hence, Washington kept the United States out of the French revolu-
tionary wars and established the basic workings of the executive
branch through unilateral decisionmaking8 6 Lincoln raised troops,
blockaded the South, and mobilized the nation while Congress was
not in session. 87 Roosevelt moved the nation toward war against one
of the most evil regimes in human history, often against the prefer-
ences of a recalcitrant Congress, and defined the structure of the post-
war world through Great Power accords, such as the Yalta Agreement,
all without congressional participation." Formal constitutional pow-
ers and their exercise have something to do with presidential success,
at least as measured by the Taranto/Leo survey.
That relationship appears to hold true among the near-great list
as well. One does not usually think of Truman, Eisenhower, Reagan,
or Polk (and maybe not even Theodore Roosevelt or AndrewJackson)
as great legislative leaders. Rather, their success occurred in part
through their unilateral leadership and the exercise of constitutional
powers. Truman and Eisenhower, for example, established the basic
containment strategy of the United States in the Cold War through
executive branch policymaking.8 9 Neither President won outstanding
85 NEUSTADT, supra note 77, at 27.
86 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
87 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 116-21 (2003).
88 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFtER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 96 (1990); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRES-
IDENCY 110-13 (1973).
89 SeeJoHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POST-
WAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 54-88, 127-97 (1982).
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legislative successes, and Truman suffered a stunning legislative rever-
sal when Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act over his veto.90 Rea-
gan's aggressive foreign policy toward the Soviet Union probably
contributed as much to the winning of that war as his large arms
buildup. Polk, of course, waged a war that dramatically expanded the
size of the United States, but also did so while somewhat contriving
the circumstances that led Congress into that conflict.9 1 Understand-
ing successful Presidents demands that scholars focus notjust on polit-
ical persuasion, but also on the constitutional powers that allow
Presidents to exercise leadership effectively.
There is no reason that this divide in the interests and methodol-
ogy of lawyers and political scientists ought to exist. Once upon a
time, scholars on the Presidency, such as Edward Corwin or Clinton
Rossiter, wrote for both communities. 92 Indeed, recent developments
in both law and political science point the way toward a common dia-
logue. In law, Bill Eskridge, Daniel Farber, and Philip Frickey, among
others, have renewed interest in the study of legislation through the
lens of institutions and public choice theory. 93 Much of this work has
focused on the organization of Congress, the role of interest groups,
and the implications for courts in interpreting ambiguous statutes.
Some scholars, however, have asked about the role of the President in
the lawmaking process and in the administrative state, not with regard
to the personality or skills of any individual Chief Executive, but
rather with attention to the Presidency's institutional place in the con-
stitutional and political system.94 Further work from an institutional
standpoint could examine the exercise of the presidential veto, the
effect of presidential legislative history, and the executive and con-
gressional struggle for control over the bureaucracy, among other top-
ics. Law professors could prove exceptionally able at these analyses
because of their knowledge of the nitty-gritty of the interactions be-
tween the branches.
Such work would be especially propitious because it could take
advantage of advances in positive political theory. This approach
90 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered
portions of 29 U.S.C.).
91 See, e.g., MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN PoLIcY 258-62 (Thomas G. Pater-
son ed., 3d ed. 1989).
92 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957
(1957); CLINTON RoSSITrER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1956).
93 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FrCKeY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991); William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990).
94 See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, TheArticlel, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 217
(1992).
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swept through the study of Congress and administrative agencies in
the 1980s and 1990s, in which the President played a role in broader
models of the legislative and administrative process. 95 Nonetheless,
these works commonly treated the President as less central to poli-
cymaking. In more recent years, scholars have used rational choice
approaches to analyze the Presidency directly. Two books in particu-
lar, Charles Cameron's Veto Bargaining6 and William Howell's Power
Without Persuasion,97 have sought to apply rational choice theory to
understand the exercise of the President's constitutional powers.
These authors are pursuing the same questions that interest law
professors. Cameron collects information on presidential threats to
use, as well as the actual use of, the veto in order to win legislative
concessions from Congress.98 Howell formally models when Presi-
dents will use their power to interpret statutes and issue executive or-
ders to engage in unilateral policymaking without the approval of
Congress.9 9 He also conducts an empirical survey of legislative over-
rides and judicial decisions to determine how executive orders fare in
Congress and the courts."' Law professors are also interested in how
the exercise of the President's constitutional powers affects national
public policy and could have pursued the same research projects (ex-
cept the equations maybe!). In fact, our focus on the President's for-
mal constitutional powers can provide a fruitful starting point from
which to identify further research questions. After all, law professors
no doubt had long assumed that the President's inherent constitu-
tional powers gave him an important role in setting national policy.
This discussion is only an effort to point out areas where law
professors and political scientists can work productively in similar
veins while studying similar problems. Legal scholarship, for exam-
ple, has benefited from the application of rational choice to the pro-
cess of legislation. We think that similar gains could occur with regard
to the study of presidential power. This means not only studying the
origins of the President's formal constitutional authorities, but also
studying the effects of their exercise and how Presidents can leverage
them into political gains with regard to the other branches. Presiden-
tial Leadership provides a metric against which we can judge whether
we have identified which exercises of constitutional power have
95 See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Polit-
ical Control, 3J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243 (1987).
96 CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGA-
TIVE POWER (2000).
97 WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESI-
DENTIAL ACTION (2003).
98 See CAMERON, supra note 96.
99 HOWELL, supra note 97, at 24-54.
ioo Id. at 101-74.
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proven more successful than others. The next Part suggests some ten-
tative ways to think along these lines.
III
There are at least three important and related lines of inquiry
that would combine the interests of law professors with the insights of
political scientists to yield a deeper understanding of the Presidency.
First, there is a set of questions relating to how the robust powers that
Presidents actually exercise could have grown from the seemingly
meager stock of formal authorities that the Constitution vests in that
office. Second, there are questions relating to how powers that the
Constitution might appear to have assigned to Congress have in effect
"migrated" to the Presidency, or if that seems an overstatement, why
Presidents have succeeded so often, by leveraging their formal powers,
in winning significant political victories without the support of Con-
gress or even against Congress's will. Third, researchers could profita-
bly examine to what degree presidential greatness (measured in terms
of the standards set forth in the Leo/Taranto study) results from a
President's willingness to deploy his formal powers in aggressive-in-
deed, revolutionary-ways.
The formal powers of the President specified in the Constitution
are few and readily enumerated. The "executive power" is vested
uniquely in him. 0 1 The President is to be the Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces, as well as of the state militia when called into
federal service. 102 The President may require the written opinion of
Cabinet officers on any subject relating to their duties,10 3 may grant
pardons and reprieves (except in cases of impeachment 0 4 ), and may
make treaties by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senators present.10 5 In addition, the President may appoint ambassa-
dors, Supreme Court Justices, and other principal federal officers,
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, may appoint inferior
officers if Congress by law vests such power in him,10 6 and may fill
vacancies that arise during a Senate recess. 10 7 The President shall pro-
vide Congress periodically with information on the State of the
Union, 0 8 may recommend legislation to Congress, and may, on ex-
traordinary occasions, convene one or both Houses. 10 9 In cases of dis-
101 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
102 Id. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
103 d.
104 Id,
105 Id. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
106 Id.
107 Id. art. II, § 2, c. 3.
108 Id. art. II, § 3.
109 Id.
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agreement between the Houses with respect to adjournment, he may
adjourn them.' "I The President may veto legislation that both Houses
have passed, subject to an overriding two-thirds vote of each House.' t
The President shall take care to ensure the faithful execution of laws
and shall commission federal officers.11 2
Were we confined to the bare text of the Constitution, the Presi-
dent might well have been a virtual cipher in our political system.
Apart from the vesting of "executive power" in the PresidentI 3-
which, as we have noted, is a clause with disputed scope and signifi-
cance-the President's powers might seem few and insubstantial. For
instance, the Constitution does not, in terms, grant the President the
authority to conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Instead, it merely
assigns him the powers to receive foreign ambassadors; to appoint,
with the Senate's approval, ambassadors to serve abroad; and to make
treaties, but only with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators
present. 1 4 One searches the text in vain to find explicit provisions for
such (established) presidential authorities as the power-indepen-
dent of any authority delegated by treaty or statute-to make binding
executive agreements with foreign governments that would supersede
contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause and that dispose of the
property interests and legal claims of U.S. citizens. 1 5 Nor can one
find express textual grants of such powers as the authority to suspend
or terminate treaties, 16 to conduct clandestine surveillance within the
United States of agents of foreign governments (including U.S. na-
tionals) on the grounds of national security, 117 or to establish rules
and regulations for the detention and trial of irregular combatants in
the war on terror.1 8 Equally, there are no obvious and explicit grants
of authority to control the direction of the Nation's foreign policy uni-
laterally in the striking and dramatic ways that Washington did in the
Neutrality Proclamation, 1 9 McKinley did in the Open Door Policy,t 20
110 Id.
1I1 Id. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
112 Id.
113 Id. art. II, §1, cl. 1.
114 Id. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
115 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942).
116 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality opinion) (holding issue of
treaty termination to be a political question).
117 See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
118 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (declining to reach the question of
whether the President's power is inherent).
119 Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 430-31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
120 1 WILLIAM M. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS
AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS, S. Doc. No.
357, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 244-60 (1910).
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Franklin Roosevelt did in the Yalta Agreement, 21 Truman did in the
Potsdam Declaration, 22 Nixon did in the Shanghai Communiqu6, 123
and even as lackluster a President as Fillmore did in ordering the Navy
to open Japan. 124 Both legal scholars and political scientists would do
well, therefore, to study why Presidents have been able to use their
formal powers so effectively to establish and maintain (usually uncon-
tested) dominance in the field of foreign policy.1 25 For example, they
might consider whether, over the decades, the executive branch and
Congress have worked out a series of Coasian bargains, under which
Congress has willingly ceded to the Executive the lead in foreign af-
fairs-usually a matter of little value to members of Congress, but
something on which the Executive places a high premium. 126
Likewise, Presidents have been successful in claiming broad pow-
ers to direct and control the federal administration and to exercise
prosecutorial discretion over the enforcement of federal law. 127 For
instance, they have claimed, without significant congressional orjudi-
cial demurral, the unilateral authority to establish systems of classifica-
tion that regulate access to sensitive intelligence information. 12 8 Even
in the area of appropriations-so clearly vital to Congress, as both
constitutional history and public choice theory attest-Presidents
have been able, at least episodically, to obtain victories in their claims
to have authority to impound (some kinds of) appropriated funds. 129
Furthermore, if any constitutional powers seem both clearly as-
signed to another branch and central to that branch's vital interests,
those would seem to be the "legislative powers" granted to Congress in
121 Report Signed at Crimea (Yalta) Conference, Feb. 11, 1945, U.S.-U.K-U.S.S.R., 59
Stat. 1823, 3 Bevans 1005.
122 Potsdam Declaration,July 26, 1945, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/doc-
uments/potsdam.htm.
123 Shanghai Communique, Feb. 27, 1972, reprinted in 5 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC oF
CHINA 1949-1979: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 2362-63 (Harold C. Hinton ed., 1980).
124 See PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 11, at 70.
125 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988) (finding a growing execu-
tive prerogative in the area of foreign affairs and calling for reform of the foreign policy
process to restore power to Congress and the federal judiciary).
126 See generally John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs
and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293 (offering a model of institutional rational choice to describe
the practice of separation of powers and discussing the executive's exercise of constitu-
tional review in certain areas, such as foreign policy).
127 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
128 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
129 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 467-68 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
1170 [Vol. 90: 1153
THINKING ABOUT PRESIDENTS
Article I.110 And, indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized as much in
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in the famous steel seizure case:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing
of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor
equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to
execute.13
Yet even those propositions, truistic as they may seem, fail to describe
the actualities of presidential power. The formal powers of the Presi-
dent to "recommend[ ] . . . laws he thinks wise and ... veto [ ] ... laws
he thinks bad"13 2 have in fact served to ensure that the President often
drives the legislative process from start to finish.1
3 3
Consider, for example, the President's power to veto legislation,
subject to Congress's authority to override that veto by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses.13 4 On the face of it, this provision conveys to the
President only a small slice of formal legislative power. Yet, as Charles
Black Jr. pointed out, the President's veto power gives him immense
leverage in congressional deliberations.1 3 5 This is because the veto
power is asymmetrical: he can veto legislation, but the majorities in
the Houses that sufficed to pass the legislation are insufficient to sur-
mount that veto. Because of the high transaction costs involved
merely in securing majorities in each House of a bicameral legisla-
turel 6-let alone two-thirds supermajorities in each-the President's
veto power enables him to wield enormous influence over the legisla-
tive process (an influence only partially offset by Congress's power to
package bills together so as to make the composite product "veto-
proof').
The leverage that the President's veto power affords him illus-
trates what we take to be a more general truth: the expansion of seem-
ingly modest presidential powers results from the comparatively high
transaction costs of legislation-costs magnified by such peculiar legis-
130 U.S. CONST. art. I.
131 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
132 Id.
133 For a discussion of the President-as chief legislator, see Vasan Kesavan &J. Gregory
Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2002).
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
135 See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, Law & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1976, at 87 (examining the presidential veto power and its substantial effect on the
legislative process).
135 For a discussion of transaction costs in the legislative process, see Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to
Constitutional Theoy, 74 VA. L. Rv. 471 (1988).
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lative practices as the Senate's filibuster. Article I creates, and the
practice of congressional and party politics reinforces, a massive iner-
tial bias in favor of the legislative status quo. The difficulty of assem-
bling and maintaining majority coalitions in both Houses to enact
legislation-especially when the legislation is controversial-is notori-
ous. The transaction costs of unilateral action by the President are, by
contrast, comparatively low. In order to develop a deeper understand-
ing of presidential influence in the legislative field, therefore, political
scientists could join forces with law professors to trace the interactions
between the formal powers assigned to the President and the proce-
dures that Congress must follow for making law under Article I.
Political scientists' study of comparative transaction costs, if cross-
fertilized with legal scholars' analysis of formal constitutional authori-
ties, might help explain presidential successes in a variety of arenas.
The executive branch's abilities to act with relatively good information
and at relatively low cost to deal with cases of "necessity" can probably
explain why both Congress and the courts have acquiesced so often in
what might seem to be ultra vires conduct by the Executive. This is not
a recent development; on the contrary, it seems to have been hard-
wired into the original Constitution.
The levying of tariffs in California after the War with Mexico in
1848 is a good example. After the war and the ratification of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceding California to the United States,
U.S. military and executive officials in California confronted the ques-
tion whether they had the continuing authority to collect peacetime
tariffs in that territory.1 7 California's military government decided to
apply general federal tariff schedules to goods imported into the terri-
tory. It also appointed a customs collector-again, after the ratifica-
tion of the treaty of peace.1 3 Even within the executive branch, some
officials questioned these actions, principally on the ground that Con-
gress had not enacted any statute for the postwar governance of Cali-
fornia. The executive branch (speaking through Secretary of State,
later President, James Buchanan) sought to justify its conduct on the
basis of "[t]he great law of necessity."13 9 When an importer chal-
lenged the legality of the tariffs, the Supreme Court upheld them,
finding implicit ratification of the military government's actions in
Congress's (and the President's) failure to change its policy.1 40 In ef-
137 See GARY LAWSON & Guy SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL Ex-
PANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HiSTORY 152-57 (2004). There was no question that they had
the authority, pursuant to the President's war powers, to collect such duties during war-
time. Id.
138 Id.
139 Letter from James Buchanan, Secretary of State of the United States of America, to
William V. Vorhies (Oct. 7, 1848), repinted in S. Doc. No. 31-18, at 7-8.
140 See Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 193-94 (1853).
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fect, the Court bowed to the compelling necessity of maintaining
some form of regular civil government in postwar California-a neces-
sity that, in default of congressional action, only the President could
meet.
Political science might also investigate how power accrues to the
Executive in default of congressional action when an emergent na-
tional consensus has not translated into effective (filibuster-proof)
congressional majorities. In situations of that kind, the President may
be able to preempt Congress and impose a political outcome that has
popular majoritarian support (and in which Congress can later acqui-
esce). John Kennedy's 1961 Executive Order No. 10925,141 which im-
posed nondiscrimination obligations on federal contractors, was such
a presidential initiative. Based on the President's asserted constitu-
tional authority to control the federal procurement process,1 42 and
modeled on earlier Executive Orders in this field by Franklin
Roosevelt,1 43 Executive Order No. 10925 established a policy that
Congress itself (owing to the resistance of congressional foes of civil
rights) could not have adopted at the time, but that it has subse-
quently been willing to leave in place and to fund.
The formal powers of the President, therefore, ensure him im-
portant competitive advantages in his dealings with Congress. Al-
though the President is not formally a "lawmaker," he can draw on
vast reserves of unilateral power to carry out the policies, both foreign
and domestic, of his own choice. The President's unique constitu-
tional position with respect to foreign affairs and military deployments
enables him to seize the initiative overseas and to present Congress
with accomplished facts, which are difficult to overturn. The Presi-
dent's control over key nodes of the legislative process-guaranteed
formally by his veto power and informally by his leadership of a usu-
ally large bloc of Congress-permits him to exploit the high informa-
tion-gathering and transaction costs of legislation, and thus to thwart
congressional policymaking. The necessity in the modern administra-
141 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).
142 See Validity of Executive Order Prohibiting Government Contractors From Discrim-
inating in Employment Practices on Grounds of Race, Color, Religion, or National Origin,
42 Op. Att'y Gen. 97, 100 (1961). As Attorney General Robert Kennedy wrote:
Except to the extent that legislative action has either required or prohib-
ited certain types of Government contracts or certain provisions to be in-
cluded in such contracts, the execuitive branch of the Government has
discretion to contract in such manner and on such terms as it considers
appropriate to the discharge of its constitutional and statutory
responsibilities.
Id.
143 See Exec. Order No. 9,346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (May 27, 1943) (creating committee on
fair employment practice); Exec. Order No. 9,001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (Dec. 27, 1941) (au-
thorizing procedures to expedite war effort); Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109
(June 25, 1941) (declaring nondiscrimination policy in defense program).
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tive state for expansive delegation of congressional powers (itself a
reflection of constitutionally ordained transaction costs of legislation)
ensures that many statutory sources of authority will be available to
the President, allowing him to introduce major policy shifts through
regulation or executive order. The President's ready access to the me-
dia-typified by the annual State of the Union Address-allows him to
set the terms of the nation's political discourse and to focus it on the
topics of particular interest to him. The much-maligned "imperial
Presidency," therefore, does not seem to us to be an aberration from
true constitutional principles, attributable to the overreaching of
wicked men like Richard Nixon, and corrigible by decisive (if regretta-
bly uncommon) congressional action. Rather, it seems to be the
likely, perhaps necessary, outcome of an eighteenth century constitu-
tional design, mapped onto contemporary conditions.
Thus, even when a President confronts an antagonistic Congress
dominated by his political opponents, the President can usually suc-
ceed in implementing major parts of his program. Moreover, this is
true even in periods of calm-as distinct from national security crises.
For example, confronted after the mid-term election of 1994 with a
Republican Congress that was deeply hostile to his legislative initia-
tives, President Clinton "repeatedly rebounded with a series of steady,
incremental reforms, each unilaterally imposed."144 These included a
patients' bill of rights, smoking limits in federal buildings, data collec-
tion by federal agencies for use in prosecuting the tobacco industry,
bans on assault weapons, the declassification of information relating
to Nazi war criminals, sanctions against warring factions in Angola,
and the dedication of millions of acres of Western lands to national
monuments.145 In the area of foreign policy, Clinton ignored signifi-
cant congressional resistance in launching the United States and its
NATO allies into a war in Kosovo-the United States's first major mili-
tary conflict in Europe since 1945.146 President Clinton also oversaw
the transformation of the NATO Treaty-by unilateral executive ac-
tion only-from a defensive alliance operating within the North At-
lantic sphere into one geared to undertake preemptive military
operations, including humanitarian interventions. 147
144 HOWELL, supra note 97, at 5.
145 Id. at 5-6.
146 For a detailed account of congressional deliberations over the war in Kosovo, in-
cluding the ultimate decision to fund U.S. military operations there, see John C. Yoo, Ko-
sovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673 (2000).
147 NATO adopted a new "Strategic Concept" in 1999. SeePress Release, The Alliance's
Strategic Concept, NACS(99)65 (Apr. 24, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/
pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. Going further than some of its European partners, the United
States also envisaged at the time that NATO would expand its sphere of operations beyond
the traditional areas of Europe and the North Atlantic so as to become "'a force for peace
from the Middle East to Central Africa.'" Major J.D. Godwin, NATO's Role in Peace Opera-
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If powerful hydraulic pressures can lead to the steady expansion
of presidential power even in times of peace, those pressures are even
more irresistible during periods of crisis, economic depression, or
war. War in particular brings the characteristic executive virtues of
speed, secrecy and energy to the fore. Bold, even radical, unilateral
executive measures to protect the nation's security-suspending the
writ of habeas corpus,1 48 mounting a naval blockade to seize foreign
ships trafficking with insurrectionary states,1 49 provoking clashes with
enemy forces in order to draw the nation into declared war,' 50 and
breaching neutrality by providing one belligerent with ships and
weapons for use against another 151-have occurred, however ques-
tionable their constitutionality.
These observations suggest yet one more area in which legal
scholars and political scientists could cooperate with mutual profit.
Presidential greatness may emerge from the interaction of extreme
tions: Reexamining the Treaty After Bosnia and Kosovo, 160 MIL. L. REv. 1, 90 (1999) (quoting
William Drozdiak, European Allies Balk at Expanded Role for NATO, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
1998, at A27).
The 1999 Strategic Concept seemed difficult to reconcile with Article 5 of the NATO
Treaty. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,
246. Article 5 provides that in the event of an armed attack against one or more of the
parties "in Europe or North America," the other parties "will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked ... to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Id. Moreo-
ver, as recently as 1991, NATO had declared its purpose to be "purely defensive." See
NATO, The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, para. 35 (Nov. 7, 1991), at www.nato.int/docu/
comm/49-95/c911107a.htm; see also Barry Kellman & Stephen Dycus, International Legal
Developments in Review: 1999, 34 Irr'L LAw. 799, 813 (2000) (noting the shift in the focus of
NATO from 1991 to 1999, when NATO abandoned its earlier "purely defensive" policy).
Notwithstanding such considerations, the 1999 Strategic Concept specifically provided for
NATO action in non-Article 5 "crisis response" operations. See Kellman & Dycus, supra, at
813. In light of the apparent expansion of the Treaty's scope and purposes without the
Senate's advice and consent, Congress directed the President to certify whether the Strate-
gic Concept imposed any new obligations or commitments on the United States. See Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 1221, 113 Star.
512, 786 (1999). In his signing statement on that legislation, President Clinton affirmed
that "the Strategic Concept does not create any new commitment or obligation within my
understanding of section 1221(a) of the Act, and therefore, will not be submitted to the
Senate for advice and consent." Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Presi-
dent (Oct. 5, 1999), available at www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/100594-presidential-
statement-on-national-defense-authorization-act-forfu.html.
148 ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
149 The Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
150 See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN PoLIcv,
1932-1944, at 287-89 (1979) (describing incident in which President Roosevelt had men-
daciously claimed that Nazi U-boat intentionally attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the Greer,
and had thereafter proclaimed naval war against Germany without congressional
authorization).
151 Acquisition of Naval Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att'y Gen.
484 (1940). For a careful and thorough review of Franklin Roosevelt's violations of domes-
tic and international legal requirements of neutrality, see Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, A Divorce
Waiting to Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and the Law of Neutrality, 1935-1941, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L.
413, 420-21, 463-66, 472-80, 484-87 (1996-97).
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circumstances (war or national emergency), formal presidential pow-
ers, and the boldness and daring of particular Presidents in testing the
outer limits of those powers. A "great" President may be one who
does not stay within carefully chalked lines of acknowledged presiden-
tial and congressional authority, but one who, to surmount a crisis,
revolutionizes the accepted understanding of his powers. Contrast
the difference in presidential styles-one making for weakness, the
other for greatness-between James Buchanan and Abraham Lincoln,
for example. Buchanan, a cautious lawyer anxious not to go beyond a
blinkered understanding of his constitutional authority, remained in-
active in the supreme crisis of impending disunion and went down as
one of the weakest of our Presidents. Lincoln, another lawyer-Presi-
dent-but far abler and bolder-rose to the emergency and raised an
army, sent it into the South, seized private property, expended unap-
propriated public funds, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and, in
the course of the war, emancipated slaves, all without prior congres-
sional approval.1 52 In saving the Constitution and the Union by such
extraordinary acts, Lincoln became "this nation's greatest war Presi-
dent-and [made] this country what it is today."153
Forceful presidencies, revolutionary constitutional vision, and the
favor of history are of the same birth. Lincoln provides one case;
Franklin Roosevelt another. Like Lincoln, Roosevelt was a revolution-
ary conservative, stretching the Constitution elastically in order to save
it. Roosevelt's vision of the President's constitutional authority em-
boldened him to order war measures of astonishing daring and
breadth, including those we disagree with, such as the internment of
Japanese-Americans and the confiscation of private industries. One
recent study of the Presidency points out that Roosevelt took ex-
traordinary steps in the months immediately preceding the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 to prepare the nation
for-indeed, to precipitate--war. In rapid succession, he seized sixty-
five Axis ships in U.S. ports (March 30), entered into an executive
agreement with the Danish minister in Washington for U.S. troops to
occupy Danish-owned Greenland in order to head off a German occu-
pation of that island (April 9), declared the Red Sea no longer a com-
bat zone so that British forces in the area could be supplied without
violating the Neutrality Act (April 10), addressed the French public
with a plea not to cooperate with the Vichy regime because of its col-
laboration with Germany (May 15), declared "an unlimited national
emergency" after the German victories in Greece and Yugoslavia (May
1 'i2 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1257 (2004) (defending Lincoln's actions on the assumption of a constitutional
power of "necessity").
153 Jay Winik, Abraham Lincoln, in PREsmEr, rtA, LEADERSHIP, supra note 11, at 80, 83.
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27), froze all previously unfrozen German, Italian, and Axis-controlled
countries' assets (June 15) , t 54 and issued orders to U.S. warships in
the Atlantic to destroy any German or Italian warships they en-
counterd (early October) .15
If Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt provide models of "great" Pres-
idents-"great" precisely because they shaped the Constitution to
their ends-what would make for presidential greatness in the future?
The post-9/11 world is likely to be one of continuing war and crisis,
with the horrifying prospect that it may eventually involve the use of
weapons of mass destruction against American cities. 156 A conflict of
this kind is strikingly novel in the history of the nation for a combina-
tion of at least six reasons. First, our principal adversary is a loosely
organized network of covert actors1 57 (an indefinite number of them
U.S. or allied nationals 58 ). Second, although this network has global
reach 5 9 and enjoys the sympathy and support of many in the Islamic
world and elsewhere,160 it is without territories or populations of its
154 See STEPHEN GRAuBARD, COMMAND OF OFFICE; How WAR, SECRECY, AND DECEPTION
TRANSFORMED THE PRESIDENCY FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT To GEORGE W. BUSH 224
(2004).
155 Id. at 227.
156 See GEORGE FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S SECRET WAR: INSIDE THE HIDDEN WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE BETWEEN AMERICA AND ITS ENEMIES 210-17 (2004) (describing the President's
responses beginning in October 2001 to credible intelligence reports that al Qaeda
planned to detonate a ten-kiloton nuclear device in New York); see also ANoNYMOUS, IMPE-
RIA.L HuBRis: WHY THE WEST Is LosING THE WAR ON TERROR 52-58 (2004) (arguing that the
use of weapons of mass destruction by Islamic insurgents is probable); John Yoo, Using
Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 729, 745-61 (2004).
157 See OIVIER Roy, GLOBALIZED IsLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 294 (2004) ("Al
Qaeda is an organisation and a trademark. It can operate directly, in a joint venture, or by
franchising. It embodies, but does not have the monopoly of, a new kind of violence.
Many groups (such as the Kelkal network in France) are acting along the same lines with-
out necessarily having a direct connection with Al Qaeda."); see also JASON BURKE, AL-
QAEDA: THE TRUE STORY OF RADICAL IsLAM 8-13, 231-33 (rev. ed. 2004) (explaining the
history and structure of the al Qaeda organization); JOHN GRAY, AL QAEDA AND WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE MODERN 76 (2003) ("Al Qaeda resembles less the centralised command struc-
tures of twentieth-century revolutionary parties than the cellular structures of drug cartels
and the flattened networks of virtual business corporations. Without fixed abode and with
active members from practically every part of the world, Al Qaeda is 'a global
multinational.'").
158 See Roy, supra note 157, at 303, 309 (describing the second wave of al Qaeda mili-
tants as consisting primarily of "students, who came from Middle Eastern countries to study
in the West; second-generation Muslims, who were either born in the West or came as
infants; and converts.").
159 See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 11 (2002)
("[Al Qaeda] is the first multinational terrorist organization, capable of functioning from
Latin America to Japan and all the continents in between. Unlike the terrorists of the
1970s and 1980s, Al Qaeda is not guided by territorial jurisdiction-its theater of support,
as well as its operations, is global.").
160 See Daniel Pipes, Who is the Enemy?, CAPITAuSM MAG., Feb. 20, 2002, at http://
capmag.com/article.asp?ID=1427 (estimating that ten to fifteen percent of the world's
Muslim population, i.e., about 100-150 million persons, are sympathetic to al Qaeda's
vision).
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own to defend. Third, this network is unconstrained by the ordinary
pressures and incentives of war and diplomacy. 16' Fourth, this net-
work is motivated by religious doctrines that permit or even en-
courage both the suicide of its own members and the mass murder of
civilians. 162 Fifth, this network engages in an asymmetric form of war-
fare that makes our military forces far less useful either offensively or
defensively than they would be against traditional enemies.16 3 Sixth,
this network has or may soon have access to weapons of mass destruc-
tion. A conflict of this character, if it proves both to be protracted and
to have a high level of lethality, will almost surely impose on this coun-
try a security strategy that entails significant constitutional change.16 4
In particular, such a conflict would likely necessitate further develop-
ments in discretionary presidential power, not reviewable (or only
lightly reviewed) by the courts. The test of presidential greatness in
these trying circumstances, as in the nation's past, will be to combine
161 See Roy, supra note 157, at 56 ("Al Qaeda terrorism is totally different from that of
the 'usual' terrorists in the Middle East and elsewhere.... [W]ith Bin Laden there is no
room for negotiation. His aim is simply to destroy Babylon."); see also MARK JUERGEN-
SMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 157 (3d
rev. ed. 2003) (noting that Osama bin Laden has described the "global struggle" of the al
Qaeda network "ultimately as not one of political and economic issues but [as one] be-
tween transcendent and worldly goals.... between religion and antireligion.").
162 See BURKE, supra note 157, at 35- As Burke observed:
Such a spectacular martyrdom [as those of the 9/11 hijackers] is . . . the
ultimate demonstration ofjihad as a testament.... A suicide attack is de-
signed to demonstrate that faith is lacking on one side and exists on the
other and so to force all aware of the martyr's action . . . to conclude that,
despite the apparent imbalance of forces, when the most important quality
is considered - the faith that is necessary for victory in the long run - it is
the suicide bomber who has it in greatest depth. In an interview in Septem-
ber 2002, al-Zawahiri stated this explicitly, saying: "It is the love of death in
the path of Allah that is the weapon that will annihilate this evil empire of
America, by the permission of Allah."
Id. See also GUNASATNA, supra note 159, at 91. As Gunaratna noted:
Martyrdom is assigned the highest priority by Al Qaeda's volunteers, who
have succumbed to the psychological and spiritual influences of Islamist
ideologues. Killing and dying for Allah are viewed as the highest form of
sacrifice. Although other terrorist groups driven by Islamist ideology, such
as Hamas, prepare [their] fighters to die for the cause, no other group has
invested so much time and effort as A] Qaeda in programming its fighters
for death.
Id. See generally PAUL BERMAN, TERROR AND LIBERALISM 128-53 (2003) (examining the
evolution of suicide terrorism from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict up to the September 11
attacks).
163 See Roy, supra note 157, at 327-28. As Roy put it:
To send an army, one needs a territory and a visible target. But borders
and frontiers are no longer territorial. There is no wall defending the en-
emy, an enemy that is more often than not too elusive to be named and
targeted, an enemy who if he is shadowy is sometimes merely our shadow.
Id,
164 On the close connection between geopolitical strategic imperatives and fundamen-
tal constitutional change, see generally PHILIP BoBBrar, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR,
PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002).
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a conservative's solicitude for this nation's constitutional traditions
with a revolutionary's audacity in adapting them to unanticipated
challenges.
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